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This dissertation contains essays on three questions about 
the labor market. In light of the fact that fi rms account for 
a substantial share of earnings inequality, Chapter 1 asks 
why some fi rms pay their employees so much and some 
so little. Although the standard explanation is that search 
frictions support an equilibrium with rents, this paper fi nds 
that compensating differentials are at least as important. To 
reach this fi nding, the paper develops a structural search 
model and estimates it on U.S. administrative data with 1.5 
million fi rms and 100 million workers. The model ana-
lyzes the revealed preference information contained in how 
workers move between fi rms. Compensating differentials are 
revealed when workers systematically move to lower-paying 
fi rms, while rents are revealed when workers systematically 
move to higher-paying fi rms. With the number of parameters 
proportional to the number of fi rms (1.5 million), standard 
estimation approaches are infeasible. The paper develops an 
estimation approach that is feasible for data on this scale. 
The approach uses tools from numerical linear algebra to 
measure central tendency of worker fl ows, which is closely 
related to the ranking of fi rms revealed by workers’ choices.
Chapter 2 asks why men and women work at different 
fi rms. It builds on Chapter 1 to consider two explanations: 
1) men and women might search from different offer 
distributions, and 2) men and women might have different 
rankings of fi rms. I fi nd that the fi rst explanation—women 
search from a lower-paying offer distribution than men—is 
the dominant one. 
Chapter 3 asks w hat are the long-run effects of the mini-
mum wage? An empirical consensus suggests that there are 
small employment effects of minimum wage increases. This 
chapter argues that these are short-run elasticities. Long-run 
elasticities, which may differ from short-run elasticities, are 
more policy relevant. To shed light on these questions, this 
chapter develops a dynamic industry equilibrium model of 
labor demand. The model makes two points. First, long-run 
regressions have been misinterpreted because even if the 
short- and long-run employment elasticities differ, standard 
methods would not detect a difference using U.S. varia-
tion. Second, the model offers a reconciliation of the small 
estimated short-run employment effects with the commonly 
found pass-through of minimum wage increases to product 
prices.
Chapter 1: Ranking Firms Using 
Revealed Preference
Firms play a central role in explaining worker earnings. 
Conditional on person fi xed effects, fi rms account for over 
20 percent of the variance of worker earnings (e.g., Abowd, 
Kramarz, and Margolis [1999] and Card, Heining, and Kline 
[2013]). But there is little work asking why fi rms play such 
a central role. There are two main explanations that differ in 
whether, from the worker perspective, high-paying fi rms are 
high-value fi rms: rents and compensating differentials. Rents 
is the leading explanation in the literature (e.g., Postel-Vinay 
and Robin [2002]). In the rents explanation, frictions prevent 
workers from bidding away the rents at high-paying fi rms. In 
this explanation, workers are lucky to end up at high-paying 
fi rms. As a result, high-paying fi rms are high-value fi rms. 
In contrast, in the compensating differentials explanation 
(e.g., Rosen [1986)]), fi rms differ both in how much they 
pay and in nonpay characteristics. In this explanation, higher 
pay compensates for variation in unpleasant nonpay char-
acteristics. As a result, high-paying fi rms are not high-value 
fi rms. Thus, measuring the relative importance of rents and 
compensating differentials means fi guring out whether high-
paying fi rms are high-value fi rms.
To distinguish between high-paying and high-value fi rms, 
this chapter estimates the value of working at a fi rm without 
using information in pay. Specifi cally, I use information in 
quantities. To do so, I exploit the revealed preference idea 
embedded in search models that workers move to fi rms with 
higher value. Using U.S. matched employer-employee data 
with 1.5 million fi rms, I map the 1.5 million by 1.5 million 
matrix of worker fl ows across fi rms into the value of working 
at each fi rm.
By comparing the fi rm-level values to fi rm-level pay, I 
fi nd that both rents and compensating differentials expla-
nations are operative, but compensating differentials are 
more important. This fi nding has four (closely related) 
implications. First it shows that in many cases the conven-
tional interpretation of high-paying fi rms as “good” fi rms 
is not warranted. Second, it contrasts with the conventional 
wisdom that compensating differentials are unimportant in 
explaining the variance of worker earnings. Third, it resolves 
a puzzle that benchmark search models are unable to repro-
duce the extent of earnings dispersion while also yielding 
plausible values of nonemployment. Fourth, the distribution 
of compensating differentials across fi rms means that the 
variance of earnings is larger than it would be if all jobs were 
equally pleasant.
In the fi rst part of the chapter, I develop a simple model 
of the labor market that contains both the rents and the 
compensating differentials explanations and develop tools 
to estimate it using only quantity information. The model 
is a benchmark partial equilibrium utility-posting model in 
the spirit of Burdett and Mortensen (1998). The nonstandard 
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ingredients in the model are that fi rms post a utility offer 
that consists of both earnings and a nonpecuniary bundle 
and that workers receive idiosyncratic utility draws (taste 
shocks) each period. On the one hand, the rents explanation 
is contained in the model because there is the possibility of 
equilibrium dispersion: different fi rms offer different levels 
of utility. On the other hand, the compensating differentials 
explanation is contained in the model because high earnings 
might be offset by a low nonpecuniary bundle. The role of 
the idiosyncratic utility draws is to add preference heteroge-
neity and allow workers to make different decisions when 
faced with the same choice. Specifi cally, these draws explain 
why there would be fl ows both from fi rm A to fi rm B and 
from fi rm B to fi rm A.
I estimate the model in two steps. First, I isolate the 
transitions that reveal preferences by using information about 
what the worker’s coworkers were doing at the time of the 
separation. In the spirit of the displaced worker literature 
(Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan 1993), if an unusually 
high share of coworkers were also separating, then a fi rm-
level shock caused the workers to leave, and there is a high 
probability that any particular separation was exogenous. In 
contrast, if turnover levels look normal, then this separation 
was likely idiosyncratic to the worker.
Second, I measure the central tendency of worker fl ows. 
I record worker fl ows in a 1.5 million by 1.5 million matrix, 
where one cell is the number of workers who go from fi rm 
A to fi rm B. The model implies a set of linear restrictions on 
the entries in this matrix and a fl ow-relevant fi rm-level value. 
The fl ow-relevant fi rm-level value captures the central ten-
dency of worker fl ows and is a known function of structural 
parameters.
Computing this central tendency of worker fl ows—and 
showing that it exists and has a meaningful economic 
interpretation—is the main technical contribution of this 
chapter. The central tendency of worker fl ows is captured by 
the top eigenvector of a normalized matrix of worker fl ows. 
Showing when this eigenvector exists and is unique requires 
a new analytical result. Computing the eigenvector relies on 
techniques from numerical linear algebra that are scalable to 
massive data sets such as a 1.5 million by 1.5 million matrix.
In addition to the value of a fi rm, two factors affect the 
central tendency of mobility. First, a large fi rm will natu-
rally have more workers moving away from it than a small 
fi rm. I account for this because I observe fi rm size. Sec-
ond, a fi rm that makes a lot of offers will naturally have 
more workers moving toward it. I account for this because 
I estimate the offer distribution using information in non-
employment-to-employer fl ows. By jointly estimating the 
offer distribution and the value of nonemployment, I allow 
nonemployed workers to reject offers.
In the second part of the chapter, I estimate the earnings 
that fi rms post and show how to combine these with the 
estimates of fi rm values to decompose the variation in fi rm-
level earnings into compensating differentials and rents. The 
model implies that—as in Abowd and Schmutte (2014)—I 
can estimate the earnings that fi rms post using a selection-
corrected version of the statistical decomposition pioneered 
by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) (and also used by 
Card, Heining, and Kline [2013]), which controls for person 
effects. 
Because I use revealed preference at the fi rm level, I 
can identify compensating differentials. At the individual 
level, about a third of employer-to-employer moves result in 
earnings cuts. As the literature recognizes, this fi nding does 
not identify compensating differentials because the pay cut 
might refl ect idiosyncratic factors that are not priced in the 
labor market. At the fi rm level, however, systematic patterns 
of workers moving from higher-paying to lower-paying fi rms 
indicates factors that are valued by all workers and are priced 
in the labor market.
Formally, I prove an identifi cation result to show how to 
measure the relative roles of compensating differentials and 
rents. Combining utilities and earnings gives a lower bound 
on the variance of nonpecuniary characteristics, which is the 
extent of compensating differentials. The complement is the 
role of rents in explaining the variance of earnings. The iden-
tifi cation result is consistent with an argument in the search 
literature that compensating differentials are hard to fi nd 
because desirable nonearnings factors might be positively 
correlated with earnings (Hwang, Mortensen, and Reed 
1998; Lang and Majumdar 2004). Specifi cally, I distinguish 
between Rosen and Mortensen amenities. Rosen amenities 
generate compensating differentials. In contrast, Mortensen 
amenities are positively correlated with earnings and gener-
ate equilibrium dispersion; for example, some high-paying 
fi rms might also offer great benefi ts. The result shows that 
in my framework the variance of Mortensen amenities is not 
identifi ed. 
I estimate the model on the U.S. Census Bureau’s Longi-
tudinal Employer Household Dynamics data set. Compen-
sating differentials explain twice as much of the variance of 
fi rm-level earnings as rents. The estimated ranking of sectors 
is intuitively plausible, as is the implied distribution of non-
pay characteristics. For example, education has good nonpay 
characteristics, while many blue-collar sectors have bad 
nonpay characteristics. The central fi nding that compensating 
differentials are at least as important as rents holds within 
subgroups defi ned by age and gender.
The fi nding that compensating differentials are important 
contrasts with conventional wisdom.1 Research that looks at 
specifi c amenities rarely fi nds robust evidence that amenities 
are priced in the labor market. By using revealed preference 
at the fi rm-level, however, I overcome a few challenges 
in this literature. First, I distinguish between Rosen and 
Mortensen amenities to allow for some amenities to be 
unpriced and contribute to dispersion in fi rm-level value. 
Second, revealed preference takes into account the entire 
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bundle of amenities. As a result, it does not take a stand on 
what workers value or how fi rms use amenities to offset 
other amenities. Third, at the fi rm level, revealed preference 
uncovers amenities that are priced. In contrast, at the indi-
vidual level, revealed preference can uncover idiosyncratic 
factors that are unlikely to be priced.
The fi nding of a large role for compensating differentials 
helps resolve the puzzle emphasized by Hornstein, Krusell, 
and Violante (2011) that benchmark search models cannot 
generate the extent of observed residual earnings inequality. 
I fi nd that workers act as if a large share of the variance of 
fi rm-level earnings does not refl ect variation in value. I also 
fi nd an empirically reasonable value for nonemployment, and 
thus pass a crucial test they propose.
Finally, if the estimated nonpay characteristics were 
removed and earnings changed to compensate workers, then 
earnings inequality would decline. The effect depends on the 
correlation between earnings potential and nonpay character-
istics. In this counterfactual, earnings inequality as measured 
by the variance of earnings declines. Many low-paying jobs 
come with good amenities, so this reduction comes mainly 
from the lower tail of the income distribution shifting up.
Chapter 2: Why Do Men and Women Work in 
Different Firms? 
Men are more likely than women to work in both high-
wage fi rms and high-wage industries. This sorting compo-
nent accounts for 9 log points of the 36 log point (about 25 
percent) gender earnings gap in the United States. A core 
interpretive issue is whether this sorting component refl ects 
discrimination or differences in preferences.2 The discrim-
ination explanation is that women would like to work at 
the same fi rms or in the same industries as men, but are 
prevented from doing so. The preference explanation is that 
there are nonpecuniary characteristics that differ across the 
low- and high-paying fi rms, and women value these nonpe-
cuniary characteristics more than men. For example, women 
might highly value fl exibility while men do not. 
In this chapter, I build on Chapter 1 to shed light on 
these two explanations. I begin by establishing the key fact 
that this chapter is interested in understanding: men are at 
higher-paying fi rms than women in the United States, and 
more generally, that men and women are sorted in the labor 
market. Building on Card, Cardoso, and Kline (2016), who 
study Portugal, I estimate the Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 
(1999) decomposition separately for men and women using 
data from the United States. This decomposition amounts 
to using the complete set of wage changes of workers who 
switch fi rms to estimate a fi rm effect in earnings. Estimating 
the decomposition separately for men and women allows me 
to construct gender-specifi c earnings premia at each fi rm. I 
reproduce the fi nding of Card, Cardoso, and Kline (2016) 
that the sorting of men and women across fi rms is quantita-
tively important; indeed, I fi nd that the sorting component is 
more important in the United States than in their Portugese 
context.
I then explain why men and women are sorted. Follow-
ing Chapter 1, I record a partial equilibrium utility-posting 
search model in the spirit of Burdett and Mortensen (1998), 
where the only nonstandard ingredient is that fi rms post util-
ity offers that combine a wage and a nonpecuniary bundle, 
and there is a (transitory) idiosyncratic utility draw in each 
match, which explains why people might make different 
choices. The model estimates revealed values of employers 
by taking into account the network structure of accepted 
offers and rejected offers.
The model embeds versions of both the preference and 
discrimination explanations for why men and women are 
sorted. The preference explanation in the model is that men 
and women rank fi rms differently; therefore, given the same 
set of opportunities, they would end up in different fi rms. 
The discrimination explanation in the model is that men and 
women receive a different set of offers, and so given the 
same preferences end up in different fi rms.
To separate the preference and discrimination explana-
tions, I estimate the model separately by men and women. 
The implicit assumption in this exercise, as with standard 
earnings decomposition exercises, is that men and women 
operate in separate labor markets. This allows me to estimate 
separate offer distributions (opportunities), values (pref-
erences), and earnings for men and women. In particular, 
I am able to estimate separate offer probabilities, values, 
and earnings for men and women fi rm by fi rm. While the 
model relies on numerous strong assumptions, estimation 
is completely nonparametric along the dimensions that this 
chapter is interested in. Namely, I impose no assumptions 
on the shape of the offer distribution, no assumptions on the 
distribution of employer values, and no assumptions on the 
relationship between men’s and women’s preferences or offer 
distributions.
My principal results are as follows. First, I fi nd that men 
and women are systematically sorted in the labor market. 
About 60 percent of men’s coworkers are men, while only 
about 40 percent of women’s coworkers are men. This fi nd-
ing is quantitatively consistent with the U.S. results in Hell-
erstein, Neumark, and Mcinerney (2008, p. 183). Second, I 
fi nd that this sorting explains over 25 percent of the earnings 
gap (given the nature of the data, some of this might include 
differences in hours). This fi nding is robust to using men’s 
or women’s earnings to compute how well-paying fi rms are. 
This extends the fi nding of Card, Cardoso, and Kline (2016) 
(for Portugal) that men are systematically employed in high-
er-paying fi rms than women.
I then use the model to interpret the reasons and conse-
quences of sorting. The model points to differences in the 
offer distribution rather than differences in preferences to 
explain why men and women are sorted. Men’s and women’s 
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preferences over fi rms are estimated to be highly correlated. 
For example, the overall estimated values have a correla-
tion of 0.89. When I aggregate to the 4-digit industry level 
(which explains two-thirds of the sorting component of the 
gender wage gap), the correlation is 0.98. But I estimate that 
women search from a lower-paying distribution. This result 
should be interpreted cautiously since the offer distribution 
is a reduced-form object that may itself contain revealed 
preference information. (Put differently, the fact that women 
are less likely to receive offers from high-paying fi rms may 
refl ect the fact that they do not want to work at those fi rms, 
rather than the fact that they do not receive offers from these 
fi rms.) The model also allows me to compare the distribution 
of employer values at the fi rms that employ men relative 
to the fi rms that employ women. Taking the model at face 
value, the estimates indicate that men and women are at 
approximately equal-valued fi rms regardless of whether it is 
men’s or women’s values that are used to value the fi rms.
Chapter 3: Are There Long-Run Effects of the 
Minimum Wage?
Infl ation and rising real wages make most minimum wage 
increases temporary. As such, the empirical minimum wage 
literature has made substantial progress estimating the short-
run employment effects of minimum wage increases. This 
effect appears to be small. Despite apparent consensus, the 
profession remains divided about the employment effects of 
minimum wage increases.
A reasonable reading of this divide is that there are some 
questions about the effects of minimum wage increases for 
which the empirical consensus provides the answer. For 
other questions, however, economists extrapolate differently 
depending on whether they think that the relevant short- and 
long-run employment elasticities differ. To the question, 
“What is the employment effect of a temporary nominal min-
imum wage increase likely to be?”, the empirical consensus 
suggests that there are unlikely to be signifi cant employ-
ment effects, because similar increases have not resulted in 
signifi cant employment effects. To the question, “What is 
the employment effect—after a few years—of a permanent 
minimum wage increase?”, the empirical consensus suggests 
an answer only if the short- and long-run elasticities of min-
imum wage increases are the same. In the United States, this 
latter question is of immediate policy relevance: President 
Obama’s 2013 State of the Union address contained a pro-
posal to index the federal minimum wage to infl ation, which 
would be a more permanent increase.
To contribute to this important debate, this chapter studies 
the empirical implications of a model that distinguishes 
between the short- and long-run employment elasticities. The 
model is based on the putty-clay nature of capital. It was fi rst 
informally discussed in the minimum wage context by Card 
and Krueger (1995, pp. 366–368), and I build on the Gourio 
(2011) version.
In the model, when fi rms pay the entry cost of building 
a machine, they can freely substitute between capital and 
labor. Once capital is installed, a fi rm cannot change its labor 
demand.
The key features of the model are that the labor demand 
choice of an entering fi rm is a forward-looking, dynamic 
decision that depends on the (expected) stochastic process 
for minimum wages. And because only some fi rms adjust 
each period, the industry-level labor demand response to a 
minimum wage increase is slow, and also depends on the 
stochastic process for minimum wages.
The model has two main empirical implications. The 
fi rst empirical implication is that the reduced-form long-run 
effects estimated in the literature are essentially uninforma-
tive about the true long-run elasticity. I simulate employment 
data from the model to replicate the data set used in Dube, 
Lester, and Reich (2010), who fi nd very small short-run 
employment effects and, using a common reduced-form 
long-run regression, fi nd no distinction between the short- 
and long-run employment effects of minimum wages in 
the United States. They interpret these results as evidence 
against the view that short- and long-run elasticities differ. 
On the simulated data, however, the reduced-form regres-
sion recovers a long-run employment effect that is barely 
different than the short-run employment effect. As such, the 
chapter suggests that it would be a mistake to infer from 
existing empirical work that proposals to index minimum 
wages to infl ation would have minimal effects on employ-
ment. Taking the model at face value shows how misleading 
such an inference might be: the results in the chapter show 
that a contemporaneous elasticity of −0.002 in response to a 
temporary increase is consistent with an elasticity after six 
years of −0.252 for a permanent increase.
The second empirical implication is that the putty-clay 
model is consistent with the pass-through of minimum wage 
increases to product prices commonly found in the literature, 
even though minimum wage increases are relatively tempo-
rary. Card and Krueger (1994, p. 792) emphasize that their 
fi nding of product price rises in response to minimum wage 
increases are inconsistent “with models in which employers 
face supply constraints (e.g., monopsony or equilibrium 
search models).” Despite this, the minimum wage literature 
has focused on models of search frictions to rationalize the 
small employment effects without focusing on the price 
results. 
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Notes
 1. For example, Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2011, p. 2883) 
write that compensating differentials “does not show too much 
promise” in explaining earnings dispersion.
 2 See, for example, the Council of Economic Advisers (2015, 
p. 3). https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/fi les/docs/
equal_pay_issue_brief_fi nal.pdf (accessed October 6, 2016). 
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